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DORRANCE P.HICKS et al., Respondents,v. JOHN REIS
.
'et aI., DefendantEl; FRED, W. GRAY, Appellant.

contradicted by that of his employee';- and wheJ:.e, inore~ver;
it may . -be inferred from the.· eriJ.ploY!le'8testhnon'thl!o~' the,
employees had permission to use. the cars to perfortn.'~heir .
duties and' that the ownei- 'impliedly consented 'to the taking
of the car in question by the employee 8,S 1!oprospective';'pur~,
chaser.
'
[2]'·Id.-Pel'sons Liable-Lender-?ossession by Person. Intrn,stcd
with Oar........;Under Veh. Code; § 402;th!l owne.r of ,an ftutomo..,
bile involved in anautb~6bileac~iderit is, .Hable bi damages
to the extent there limited if his perniittee consents to another
driving, at least where thepermjttee' accomjnillies the drivei'.
(3] Id.-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession· bi . Employee.":"In
an automobile accidentca~e,if 'the evidence -l!how~ that::the
automobile was being driven by an employee of the defendant
employer at the time of the accident, the jury may infer that
the employee was operating the !!.utomobile' with the' pCrixiission of the owner.
'.
[4]' Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Disregarding 'l'esti~
mony.-Provided the trier of the facts .does nofact'arhitrarilf,
,he may reject the testimony of a witness in its entiretY';eten
though the witness is uncontradicted. lience, asa general
rule the trier .ofth!l' facts is free ,to disbelieve tes~iniony' as to
the 'n:one~istence of a fact in issue and to :fInd that it dOes
exist solely on the basiso£an inference.
[5] Evidence......lnferences.......Question (if Fact.-The trier of _the
,facts· may notin.!Iulge in an inierencewhenthat inference is
rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence. of
such a nature that it is not subject to doubt in, the, minds of
reasonable men, or when it is of such a nature that' the' minds
of reasonable men cannot differ on the subject; ,but' if there
is any reasonable doubt as to whether the inference, 'as' ~'
matter of law, has been rebutted, that doubt' should be r~~
solved in favor of submitting the question to the tIier, of the

[l.-Ic]· Autombbiles·,- Persons· Liable--.Le.Jlders-possessionby
. Employee-:-Permission;-Whether an infel'en¢e·.of. pen;nission
fora used carsalesman's driV'ing of an automobile is rebutted
is a question of fact where, assuming theowner;s testimon1
to the absence of permission to be uncontradicted, the trier of
the facts in passing thereon may consider the manner in which
he testifies, etc., and in addition thereto his interest in ·the
result of the -case; where, aside from this,' his testimony is

[6] Trial-Findings_Negative Pregriant.-Whe~e
:'afih.rii~tiv.'
. defense presents a single .issue, e.g., whether;a'j~llih.iti1l' ~a:,
guilty of contributorY ilegli;gel1(\~; a ftndiDgthat "a:U,j :tllQ';aiJ
,legations of the defense are untrue issufflcient." .,
' ;\ '; '""
[7] Automobiles - Persons Liable-- Lend!lt';';'Possession,bf Em:;
ployee--.Evidence...,-.Iitan automobile . accident ' case:, invol-nhg
the question of an automobilesalesinan's-perniissionto,take~
the car in question and whetherempl~yees were authoriz~d:

McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-, 7J Automobiles, § 167(4); I2J
Automobiles, §l67(6); [4] Witnesses, § 297(1); [5] Ev!dence,
'§ l,W;. (6] Trial, § 339.

,'[4J Disregarding uncontradicte4t!lstiniony, hQte,8:ALlf.;:79a;
See; also, 27 Cal.Jur. 182; 28 Bi.O.L. 660.'
.
.. ,
(5J See 10' Oal.Jur. 738.

ing that Mrs. Larrabee was entitled to the property left to
Kate ChaseiDstructing the trustee. to convey the disputed
share to her; and allowing a sum. of $1,250 for attorney's fees.
Wellman has appealed from this judgment, contending that
the trustee could not in.aintain this action and that no' attorney's fees should have ~een allowed.
The trustee at the time this proceeding was commenced,
was faced with conflicting demands threatening a possible
double liability. It was entitled to judicial instructions as
to its duties under the trust agreement. (See Security~First
Nat. Bk. v. J. D. Millar Realty Co., 217 Cal. 277 [18 P.2d
339].)
[2] No error has been sho~ in the allowance of .~ttor~
ney's fees to the trustee. The truil court found ~hat th~ action "was necessarily brought," and under sectIOn 2273· of
the Civil Code a t~ustee "is'entitled to the repayment, out of
the trust property, of all expenses actually-and properly-incurred by hitn. in the performance of his truSt." Appellant
has not objected to the amount of the allowance.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J' t Curtis, J., Edmonds, J'j Carter, J., Traynor,J.,
and Peters, J, pro tern., concurred.

fL. A. No. 18523. In Bank. Feb. 26, 1943.)
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to t~kecars with~ut' permissi~n, testi~ony of the ~alesman
that .he told another. ~mployeEl of his intention to take the car, "
although . inadmissible to show permission, is admissible. to
BhOw the factssurrpunding the ~akingand also to .BUp})Ort the
·employee's (lontelltionthat the employer ,ha:l no rule prohibit.
the taking of cars.
.

mg

AP~EAt

from a judgment .of the Superior Court of":Ven.

tura County. Louis C, Drapeau, Judge. Affirmed.

Action for damages for injuries. to person and propcrty
sustnined in an autopiobile collision. Judgment against the'
Owner of thecolIid,ing car, the driver; and
employee of
the owner, affirmed on appeal 'of the owner.

an

Jennings & Belcher,.lfrank B. Belcher arid Louis E. :Kear.
ney· for Appellant.
. James C.lIolluigsworth, Henderson & Churchill and E.
Perry ,Churchill' for; RElspondents.
,>PETERS, J. pro teDl.;-Plaintiffsj husbimdarid wife, recov-

excd judgItient against defendantS&tanl~y ReisandJohn Reis

in the BUIll. of $6,487,andagairist defendant FredW.Gray
mlth~ sum .qf$5,OOO, as 'damages for' hiJuries.· sustained by
themAnacolliSionof their automobile with a car owned by
Gray and driven' by Stanley Reis .at the request
J ohnRcis,
an employee of Gtay..' Gray was held liable \lhder section 402
6f the Vehicle Code, imposing liability on owners up to $5,000
for the negligence of any personu~ing or operating an 'n'utoDidbUe with the consent, express or implied, of the own cr.
The . case was tried before the' court without a jury: Gray
alone. appeais.
.
The trial court found that the Oldsmobile driven by Stanley waS owned by Gray:; that John was, on J up.e 14, 1940
(the date of the accident), employed by Gray;, that.at the time
of the- accideritJohn and Stanley" did carelessly, recklessly ,
and Jiflgligently drive and operate said Oldsmobile" so a.s to
cillJ,Seit'to~ol1ide' With respondents'car; that as apl:.o~tJ.llate
~~ult of such. negligence the respondents suffered the damages round by the court; that at the time of theacciJeut
"John Reis was using and operating said Oldsmobile automppile~ith .the permission of defendant Fred, W. Q:ray";
that Stallley Reiswas dr~ving the car •• at the request of and
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tinder theiin:mediate direction and contr'Ol of defendant John':
Reis." [la] One of the main contenti?ns urge~ ~y appel .., ..
tant is that as a matter of law, the findmg that h;e grante~
permission 'to. John Reisto use th~ car is l.lru.IUi>p~rted ~brf . •.
the eVidence. On this issue theeVldence most favorable ~~.
respondents if;l as follows :
.
.
. . ... ,'. ..'::~"
Appellant was a dealer in secorid-?an.d cars, Frankp~:.t:IlllD:~\ ,
was hissaleamanager, and John RelS was employed as a'sale~-::,-: .
nian~ On: the night of June '13,1940, John, being' thenalonc'
.
on the sales lot arid admittedly then jn charge 9f t:ttelot; Jeft:
hisoWilautomobile there, and .took:~ Oldsmobile'belongin}f .
to appellant from the lot to his home. The ne~~ay -wasb~
birthday and he did not report for work. Durmgthed~~he
drove the Oldsmobile some thirty-seven miles. On thatn,l~ht "
Johri and his brother Stanley, arid two women,took a ,rIde .
in the. car, Stanley, at John's suggestion andr~quest~ drivirig.,
They drove from Los Angeles to. Oxnard, ~ dist~ce of ~ver
sixty miles, and on the return trIp the aC~lden: WIth re~pon
dents occurred. The question to bedetermmed is 'whether the
trial court's finding that at that time and place John' was
using the car with the ~onsent of appellant is 'supporte~, by
the evidence. On this lssue respondents were com,pelled to .
reiy on the testimony of John and of ap:pe~lant, defendants
called under section 2055 of the Code of· CIvIl Procedure,and·
upon. the testimony of Burne, salesmanager 'of appellant.
John testified that he had been working for appellant about
. three weeks' before the accident; that he had worked for appellant on a prior occasion; that at no time during.his previous or during his. last employment had he ev~r been mstructed
by Htime or appellant, or anyone else, not to take cars from
the lot without' first. securing the consent of appellant or of
Hume; that he had' never been informed of any such rule;
that during his last employment, on several occasions, he had
taken cars off the lot to demonstrate them to prospects; that
he had' occasionally taken a company car from the lot an~
driven to lunch; that ifBume was there he told Burne where
he was going, not to secure his permisf;lion, but so that he
would know where he was; that if Bume or appellant were
not there' he took the cars without telling anyone; that Burne
knew he took the cars for these purposes j that when he had
l~ft appellant's e:mploy on the previo~ occasioll ?e had not
been fired by Gray for taking a car overnight WIthout per~
mission' that no such thing occurred; that he left his em"

..
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ploy with appellant to secure more money and that appel.
lant told him of another job and introduced him' to his
new employer; that some~ime prior to June 13, 1940, he be·
came interested in purchasing the Oldsmobile' for himself;
that he discussed the purchase with appellant, and particu.
larly discussed with him the details of the proposed purchase;'
that he also discussed the proposed purchase with Chapman
and Daly, two other employees of appellant; that he ran
the motor on the lot but wanted to assure himself the car
was in good condition; that he took the Oldsmobile for that
purpose; that on June 14th he drove the car some thirty.
seven miles and was satisfied with its performance; that on
the night of June 14th when they rode to Oxnard he "would
have liked to have had" his brother Stanley's opinion of the
car before he purchased it; that he asked Stanley to drive.
Much of this evidence was contradicted by appellant and
his salesmanager, Bume. Appellant testified that when Reis
was formerly employed by him he took a car from the lot
and kept it overnight and was discharged for so doing; that
when he re-employed John, about three weeks before the accident, he told him that it was a rule of the company that
no car should' be taken from the lot without his consent,
or the consent of Bume; that he never had any conversation
with John about the purchase of the Oldsmobile; that he
never knew of John taking a car to lunch and never knew
of John taking a car off the lot for any purpose without first
securing permission. He admitted, however, that on the night
of June 13, 1940, John was in charge of the lot and was
authorized to write contracts of sale. Although he testified
that no salesman ever took a car off the lot for demonstration
or other purposes without consent, he also testified that salesmen were empowered to demonstrate cars "around the
block" and that he instructed Reis that "if anyone wanted
a demonstration to go with him." .
Frank P. Hume, salesmanager of appellant, corroborated
appellant in most respects. He contradicted John Reis by
testifying that he had instructed John that cars were to be
taken off the lot for demonstration purposes only and that
either he or appellant must be notified if a car was taken.
He testified that he had no knowledge of any case when a
salesman had ever taken a car without first securing permission.
,
On this evidence, can' it be said that the finding that John

was using the car with the permission of appellant, is t9tally .
unsupported by the evidence as a matter of law 7' The fact
that Stanley was actually driving the car is immaterial. The
evidence clearly demonstrates that Jolin was using and op~
erating the car through the instrumentality of Stanley. Both
John and Stanley so testified. [2] The law is well settled
that under section 402 of the Vehicle Code the owner is
liable to the extent there limited if his permittee consents
to another driving, at least where the permittee accompanies
the driver. (Sutton v. Tanger, 115 Cal.App. ~67 [1 P.2d
521]; Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal.App.2d 349 [37 P.2d
99] ; Armstrong v. Bengo, 17 Cal.App.2d 300 [61 P.2d 1188].)
. The real question, therefore, is whether there is any evidence,.
or inference from the evidence, to support the finding that
John was using the car with the permission' of appellant at
the time of the accident.
.
[3] The law is settled that "If the evfdenceshows that
an automobile was being driven by an employee of the owner
at the time of an accident, the jury may infe~ that the employee was operating the automobile with the permission of
the owner." (Blank v. Ooffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 460 [126 P.2d
868]; see, also, Bttshnell v. Yoshika Tashiro, 115 Cal.App.
563 [~ P.2d 550]; McWhirter v. Fuller, 35 Ca1.App. 288
[170 P. 417] ; Pozzobon v. O'Donnell, 1 Ca1.App.2d 151 [36
P.2d ,23'6] ; Brown v. Ohevrolet Motor 00., 39 Cal.App.738
[179 P. 697]; Wagnitz v. Bcharetg, 89 Cal..App. 511 [265
P. 318]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Ca1.2d 360 [94 P.2d 590].)
Under this rule the trial judge, as the trier of the facts,was
justified in inferring permission existed. [lb] Appellant
contends that the inference was rebutted as a matter
of law. Such contention is not sound. The trier of
the facts is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses. (§ 1847, Code Civ. Proc.) While this same section,
declares that a witness is presumed to speak the truth, it
also declares that "This presumption, however, may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies, by' the character
of his testimony . . . or his motives, or by contradictory evi~
dunce." In addition, in passing on credibility, the trier o~
the facts is entitled to take'into consideration the interest of
the witness in the result of the cast!. (See cases Mllected. 27
Cal.Jur. 180, § 154.) [4] Provided the trier of the' faC'ts
,does not act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testiinony
,:
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of a witness, even though the witness is uncontrndicteli
(Blankv. Coffin, supra; Hinkle v. Sou.thern Pacific 09., 12
Cat2d 691 [87 P.2d 349]; Barsha v .. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
~2 Ca1.App.2d 556 [90 P;2d 371] ; B1trkc v. Bank of Amer~ca etc. Assn., 34 CaLApp.2d 594 [94 P.2d 58]; People v.
!'a ]!leur,42 Ca1.App.2d 50 [108 P;2d99] ; see cases collected
In 27 Citl.Jtir. 182; § 156; 8 A.L.R. 796.). .As a general rule,
therefore, the trier of the' facts is free to disbelieve th'e evidence as to the non-e;;cistence of the fact of permission, and
tp find that it does e~ist solely on the basis of the inference .
. (Blank v. Coffin, supra;Bushne~l v. Yoshika'tashiro, supra;
Day v.. Gep,eraJ Petroleum Oorp:, 32 Oal..~,pp.2d220·· [89
r.2d718].) In. discussing the rule that the trier of the· facts
IP-ay find. the fact ,of permission to exist based on the infer~
e~ce even whel:"e the evidence contrary theretp is uncontradIcted, thecotirt, in. Market Street By .. Co> v; George, 116
CaL.4Pp. 572,576 [3 P .2d 41], stated: "It has always been
,~he rul,~ that cou~ and juries' are not bound by mere swearIng no matter ?o~ ~os~tive, unless it be credible swearing.
It may b~ar WIthIn Itself the Seeds of its own destruction
as whe~e)t is inbe:ently improbable, or it'S destru~tiont:na.;
be wrought fr?m WIthout, as where the person swearing- is.in
so~e manner .Imp~ached. In either case court and jury' are
entItled to disbelIeve the testimony if they choose, and if.
tIrey do refuse it credence, it is of no more effect than if it had
,not -been given.. It disappe8l'$ fr9m the ease and the inference opposed to it is no longer contradicted. "
".
, [5] ,To these· well. settled rules there is a commOnsense
limited exception which is aimed. at preventing the triel'o£
the ,facts from running· away with the case. This limited
~xception is that the trier Of the facts. may not ind:u!ge 'in
t~e Inference when that inference is rebutted byclear,p:oSi~
tIve and uncontradicted. evidence of such a nature that it is
not subject to doubt in the mindsM reasonable 'men. The
'. trier ~f the facts may' not believe impossibilities. When. the
!ebuttIn~ testimony is of sU'ch a, nature that the minds of
reasonable men cannot differ on the subject, then the tri~rof
the~acts cannot, and should not be permitted to, indulge in
the mference. If there is any· reasonable doubt as to whether
the inference, asa matter of law, has been rebutted, that
doubt sI:0uld be resolved i~ favor of SUbmitting the question
. to the trIer of the facts. This limited excepti()n WB$. expressed
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as' foI1owsin Blankv. Coffin, supra, at page 461: "If thE!
evidence 'contrary to .the existenCE! of .the fact is 'clear, ,posi-'
ti\re, uncontradicted, and of such .a nature that it cannot,
rationally be disbelieved, the court must inst~ct. the. jury'
that the nonexistence of the fact 'has been estjtbUshedas. a
matter. of law," citing Engstrom·v. Auburn Auto Sale~ Oorp,,:
11 Ca1.2dM [77 P.2d1059]; Crouch v. Gt'lmore Oil. Oo.~,
Ltd., 5 Ca1.2d 330 [54 P.2d709]; Maupi'n v. Solomtm, 41.
Oal.App.323 [183 P.198]. In the same case; after poin~~,
ing out that the jury is the sole judge of the eredibi1i:tY of'
. the witnesses and may disbelieve an uncohtr~dictE!d witness .
Utherids any rational ground for doing so, the'cbui-t:sta,ted
(p. 461); '.'In most C8.'3es, therefore, thejul'y is free j;o,diS~ .
believe the evidence as to. the 'nonexistence of th~ ~act and;'~
find·thaUt does exist on the basis of the inferenceY. "; ..'..
, '[lc]' The instant· case clearly discloses a fi1ctua~. siWA~o~',
where the question as to whether theinference,:w~s re.b~t~d '"
,was' for the' trier of the facts. The rcbutting. t~tiiri6nyw.~
not .. llnc.ontradictcd. PracticalJy every material ,fact f;esti1i,e4
to'bY appellant and his employee Hume on the isSue of per-.
mission, was directly contradicted by John Reis, anQ~h()r-'dei'
fend ant. ,Thus John contrl;\dicted their testimony that: ,4
rwe existed·' prohibiting employees from taking car's . fr~nD,.
the lot; that they had informed John of this rw.(l;that John
)iad been fired on a previous occasion for taking aCi~~with~
'out permission; that John had nev~r t:i'keri. ~. car. ftotni4~
jilt without p~rinission; that John had discussed the P1lt<?liaSe
of the car with them. The trial judge, as the trier Qftne
faets, sa:w these witnesses. He kne,'V appellant and Hume
,~ercfinitIieially interested hi defeating. liability. He cho~~ ~o
believe John and to disbelieve appellant'imd lImne., ' ~l1a~
was his 'province. Under such circufustances he 'Y~s justified,
;in disbelieving all the evidence prpffered by appellaht .Qnt.1J,e'
.~s~ue of permission. He was 111so' justified in' basing his tind.'irig of permission solely on the inference. .:M()reove~, tI1e' itt.ference was supported not only by the evidence thattheOIds.mobile belonged to appellant' and John was his employee,
'but alSo by the evidence of John. From his testimony it iii
'l;'e.asonable to infer that employees had the pel'lllission of appellant to take cars from the lot whenever it was reasonably
necessary to perform their' duties; that. J 6hn took the Olds-,
,~obile in order to satisfy himself before purchasing itjthat

.1
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appellant knew he was a prospective purchaser, and that appellant impliedly consented to the tiling.
'[6] Appellant urges other points for a reversal. He contends that the court's finding on contributory negligence on
the part of respondents is in the form of a negative pregnant, "
and, in effect, finds that respondents were guilty of contributory negligence. In his' answer appellant pleaded on
information and belief as ' 'a separate and affirmative answer and defense" that respondents were guilty of contributory negligence. The trial court found "That all of the
allega~ions contained in paragraph I of the separate ~d
affirmative ariswer and defense of defendant, Fred W. Gray,
contain,ed in the answer of defendant, Fred W. Gray, on file
herein are not true;" By thus finding that "all" such allegations were not true appellant urges that the court necessarily found that some of them were true, citing such cases
as -Austin v. Harry E. Jones, Inc., 30 Cal.App.2d 362 [86 P.
2d 379], and Wiles v. Hammer, 66 Cal.App. 538 [226 P.
651]. It is true that when an allegation in a pleading contains a series of affirmative allegations, a finding that "all"
of them are not true implies that some of them are true.
Rut that is not the situation here. In this case the affirmative
defense presented a single issue, that is, whether respondents
were guilty of contributory negligence. No other ultimate
fact, was presented by the defense. The finding that all of
the allegations of the defense were untrue necessarily amounts
to a negativing of the defense. This is fundamentally different from the situation presented in the Austin case. There
the court, found that "all the affirmative allegations" ina
designated paragraph of an answer were not true, and then
in the same finding found that a specific allegation of that
paragraph was not true. Obviously, in finding that all the
"affirmative" allegations were untrue, the court fell into
the same error as where a court finds that "all materiai"
allegations are true or untrue. The uncertainty thus created
voi..,ds the finding. Moreover, by finding one specified allegation of the paragraph was untrue, the court cast doubt
On what it meant by "all affirmative allegations." That is
not the situation here. In the instant case there is no doubt
but that the trilJ-I court intended to and did find that respondents were not guilty of contributory negligence. Similar findings have frequently been upheld. (Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal.App.479 [84 P_ 326]; Stevens v. Stevens, 215

F~b.1943]
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Cal. 702 [12 P.2d 432]; Hackler v. Tubach, 129 Cal.App.
.. .
680 [19 P.2d 295].)
.
, [7] Appellant also contends that the trial courterrorieous:ly, over his objections, permittedJohn Reis, to testify as
to a conversation had with Daly, another employee ofappeIlant, in which conversation Reis testified he told Daly he
was going to take the Oldsmobile. Appellant urges that
there was no showing that. Daly had authority to permit the
car to be taken. Although there was no evidence of authority on the part of Daly to authorize the taking, and, therefore, the evidence was not admissible to show' permission, it
was admissible to show the facts surrounding the taking, and
to show the conduct of John .Reis in taking the automobile.
The important issue was whether employees were .authorized
to take cars without permission. The ,fact that John told
Daly he was taki:p.g the car was relevant .evidence to support
his contention that there was no rule prohibiting the taking
of cars. John's conduct in taking the car was, relevant on
this issue.
The judgment· appealed from is affirmed.
~

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Curtis, J.,

,':;";'

concu~ed.

CARTER, J., Concurring and dissenting.-I concur in
the judgment of affirmance as I am of the opinion that the
evidence is sufficient to justify the inference that John Reis
was using and operating the automobile involved in the accident with the permission and consent of defendant Gray at
the time of the accident.
I do not, however, agree with that portion of the majority
opinion which places reliance upon the rule announced in the
majority opinion in the case of Blank v. Coffin~ 20 Ca1.2d
457 [126 P.2d 868], with reference to when an inference
may be rebutted as a matter of law, and I adhere to the
views which I expressed in my concurring opinion in the
case of Blank 'v. Coffin, supra, which, when applied to the
facts of thi~ case justify the conclusion reached by the trial
'court.
To my mind there is no basis in reason, logic or common
sense ,for the F.ltatement in the majority opinion that "when
the rebutting testimony is of such a nature that the minds
of reasonable men cannot differ on the subject; thell the trier

,

;

664

HICKS V. REIS

[210.2d

of facts cannot, Ilnd shoulrl not be permitted to, iudlilge in
the inference." The import of this statement JS that if the
trial judge or the jury draws an inference from cert:iin
proven facts notwithstanding rebutting evidence which an
appellate court considers sufficient to rebut the inference,
then, the trial judge and the members of the jury do not
have reasonable minds; in other words, the inevitable effect
of such a rule is that in every case in which IU1 appellate
court thinks that an inference has been overcome by rebutting evidence and reverses a finding of a trial judge or a
judgment based upon the verdict of a jury, both the trial
judge and the jury are placed in the category of persons not
posscssing reasonable minds. Such Ii theory is not the prod'uct of sound reasoning and disregards the basic concept of
the finality of determination of issues of fact by the trial
forum..A trial judge and a jury hear the witnesses testify,
observe their demeanor on the witness stand, scrutinize the
exhibits, and in many cases make ocular observation of the
subject matter of the action. They are' in a much better
position to determine the weight and effect of an inference
than any appellate court justice could possibly be.' If, as
the majority opinion concedes, the trier of fact is the exclusive judge as to the weight and effect of evidence, then it
must necessarily follow that when evidence is presented fr.om,
which the trier of fact is justified in drawing an inference,
if he sees fit to give such inference greater weight than any
evidence offered in rebuttal, it should not lie in the provin('e
of an appellate court to say that because he accorded to the'
inference greater weight than the evidence opposed to it,
he did not possess a reasonable mind. The trial judge and
the jury are presumed to have reasonable minds, the' majority opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. If we Indulge in the presumption that· appellate andSllpreme Court
justices have reasonable minds, we have It situation in every
case where it is contended that an inference was rebutted"
.in which therc may be reasonablc minds on both sides of
the issue. To then apply the rule announccd in the majority
opinion would in every case result in an afIirmance of the
judgment based upon inferences drawn from prov(,u facts
if it iogical course of reasouing- is pursued. In It trial by jury
,where all twelve jurors agree upon the verdict. and the trial
,jud~edcllies a motion for a new trial we hnye a Rituation
where there are thirteen minds concurring iu the same con-
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elusion. Should they all determine th~ta~jIlference should'
prevail over rebuttiug evidence, to ~e ,c,prltrary.8l1d .three'
justires on nn appellateeourt should arrive, at a contrary
conclusion, we would have the anomalous:situation of thr~e,
justices who did not hear the witness~s( testify, observe their
demeanor on the stand or have any' personalcf:mtact .with
the subject matter of the action declaring, thatnon~ of the
thirteen persons constituting the trial forum possessed rea~
sonnble minds. The absurdity of this type of metaphysical
leg-alism should boso apparent that no reasonable mind should,
venture to promulgnte it much les!! announce it as a principle
.'
of jurisprudence.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The operative fact .incumbent
upon plaintiffs to t~stablish in this case was the ojvn:er'scon"
sent to the use of the automobile. ThiR .fact ,must be estab.:
lished, not with certainty or beyond a reasonable dotibt,l)ut
as probably true. Only if the trier of facts coultireason':.
more probable
ably conclude from the evidence that it
that the employee wru; operating the. allto:ri:tobilewith-.tJle
owner's consent than without it can the finding to:'that eRect
be su~tained. Such:t conclusion may be rea,~'hed 'by w~Yc,ot
:m inferellce, in accord with the rUle recently;' aftirmeg' jn
the mnjority upinion in Blank v. Coffin, 20 Oa1.2d ~457, ,'460~ ,
. 461 [12G P.2d 868]-:" An inference. isa conclusion'as tOJhe
'existence of a material fact that a jurY mayprop~rly .draw'
from the existence, of certain priniary fnctS.'(Cal:. Cod~ ,Cl~
Pioe., sees. 1958, 1960, 1832; see cnscs cited . in' 10 Oa1.Ju~;
736~738, sec. 59.) It is not always pOSsible' for.aparty to
It l:n.vsuit to introduce' tyvidcnce directlybearing"upbn·thO'
existence of a fact that hc is attemptilig to prove~The' ~Vi:"
dence available to him may .!':erv(J ollIy to establiaii therotist'once of certn.in primary facts that are logically. co*ne~~~dW:it1i
. the material fact. If a jury can reasonably infer from tb'eBC
p~imary factr. that the mntcrinl fact. 'exists, the'. 'party 'has
introducedsufficicnt evidence to' entitle hin:t toha'Ve the.jurY
decide the iF:sue. The jury .iR not compelled to ,draw the .in:.
ference, however, even in thc absence of eon:trary .Jlvidence
and may refuse to do so. Whether apat1;icular 'inference
can b,e drawn from certain evidence. is a. questiort of law;
but whether the inference shall he: drawn, in any given: ca'se,
'is a question of fact. for 'the jury. (See cases cited ill' 10' c~t.
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Jur. 788-739, sec. 60.)" This language makes it clear that
an inference frQm the facts proved. must be a reasonable one.
The essence of an inference is its reasonableness, as this court
recognized when it denied a hearing in Mmtpin Y. Solomon,
41 Cal.App.323, 326 '1183P. 198], declaring: "When we Say
that a certain inference is warranted by certain facts proved, '
~~ mean no' more than that the jury is reasonably warranted in making that deduction from the facts." (See, also,
Orouch v. Gilmore Oil 00., 5 Ca1.2d 330 [54 P.2d 709];
Grand Lodge of A.O.U.W. v. Miller, 8 Cal.App. 25 [96 P.
22].)
The majority opinion, invoking certain statements in Blank
v. OotJi'JI-, supra, holds,that the single fact that John Reiswas
appellant 'semployee warrants the inference that he waS ~p
erating the automobile, with appellant's consent at the time
Qf ,theacci4ent, and reduces the' issue to whether the inference was dispelled by the evidence. The, first question, h~w
eve~, is whether an inference of consent can reasonably be
drawn from all the evidence favorable' to plaintiffs; if, it
cannot, the question whether it is dispelled never arises.
It is my 'opinion that such alL inference cannot reasonably
be drawn from. the single fact that the person operating the
automobile, at the time of the accident was an employee of
the, owner. ' The statements in Blank v. Ooffin that it can are
too broad and, must, be readi:q the light of the many facts
in'that case beyond the single one that the automobile was
operated by an employee of, the owner: •• The testimony of
Coffin and, Stuperich revealed the following facts that would
justif~ the jury .in concluding ~hat' Coffin was driving the
"automobile with the tacit permission of the defendant :Coffin was given el::clusive possession o,f the automobile; he kept
it in his 'own garage without charge to the company; the
manual of instructions that he received forbade the use' of
thc car on vacations, but did not forbid its use for personal
matters; the company could determine that Coffin was habitually using the car for his personal busi:qess by checking his
mileage reports against his gasoline reports; Coffin was not
discharged after discovery of his use of the car on a weekend triI> and was allowed to resume possession of it after
a short lay-off." It was the sum olall these facts that led
the court to hold that the iIiference of the owner's consent
was a reasonable one. When, however, the fact stands alone
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~at th,e car' was operated by ,an emplo1ee .Qf ,the'owiie~: - ,.'
.there is no more reason toinfe~ the owner's -conSeIit troni,the: '
7mployer-employee relationshi~~ari there' 'woti~.d qe,.!~'fut~r
1t froID. any' one, of countless soc1al Qr busine~ i~~la:tlOtJ.!iliips
that could exist between th(l operat,oz> ot a car andltsoWIiel'~
It does not follow that becaUsilan-employel' owns&: c~r'h~
consents to its use by an em:ploYEle,or ',thlita' ca~ 'tltkeh'pyan
employee from his place of employ-mentIs taken'Withthe.
owner's consent any more than if it were taken from the
street.
'
Nosuch inference can be draWn in the presep.t. case 'fronl
the evidence most favorable to respondents. Johrl ReiswaS
in charge of the lot the night he took the car. ' lIe had hia
oWn car with him and had not requested. permission totllke
a company car from the lot. He took the cat without· the
knowledgeof appellant or HUzPe, th~ manager of the lot.
He kept %t oyerliight, but did not report for work the next
day, whichwa.s his birthday. On a previous occitSl.on he :had
,taken a car out overnight and returned it the follOWIng inor,niIlg after covering a distance of 14 miles. He had occasionally taken cars from the lot for demonstration to customers
and for' transportation to lunch a few blocks' away, H~wa.s
interested in purchasing the automobile. and.hadtalked with
appellant about it, but was finllnciallyunableto make ~uch
aplirchase. He had five years' el::perience iIi selling 'used
.car!! and was familiar with motors. He had. run the motor
while it was standing on the lot and on the llightof June
13th drove it six or seven miles to ;his home. He was not
satisfied with it then but by the time he had. driven it the
. nel::t day for about 37 miles. he, was satisfied with ita performance. That. night he 'and his brother Stanley' and,two
wOmen took a ride in the car. The purpo$e of this triP, was
"mainly social." John Reis wanted his,brother's opinion
of the car. and asked him to d.rive. John RelS t~olight they
would go on to Santa Barbara but they turned:'back at Ol::nard, about 60miies out of Los Angeles,' becailsil'6f'thecltilly
wel1ther.,JohnReis sat in the rumble seat part of· the time
with one dfthe women and the rest olthe timealQll~. .
~ trier6ffacts might reasonably infer froDl this evidence
that John Reis had appellant's permission to-:tlse cars on the
lot. for demonstration and for small personal errands; aild
to tryout the car himself in the usual manner as a prospec-
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tive customer. 'It is quite 'another matter to infer that he
had the owner's consent. to retam the car for thirty-six hours
or more and take his brother and two women, on a 120 mile
pleasu!e trip. There is no evidenCe from which it can reasonably be inferred, that appellant gave his consent to so
exten&ive an appropriation of the automobile. The rule is
well settled that the owner is not liable for injuries. caused
by thev,ser of his' car in the' course of a use exceeding that
for which consent was given.! (Henrietta v. Evans, lOCal.
2d 526' [75 P.2d 1051]; Engstrom v,, Auburn Auto. ,Sales
Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77P.2d :t059]; Di, Rebaylio v. Herndon, 6 CBrl.App.2d 567 [44 P.2d 58i] ; Souza v. Oorti,· (Cal.
.App;) [129 P.2d 729].)
Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 25,
1943. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a hearing.
Schauer, J., did not participate therein.
"'Reporter's Note: In Souza v. Oorti the Supreme Court
granted a hearing on November 27, 1942.

[L. A. No. 17765. In Bank. Mar. 1, 1943.J
PHOEBE A. MARLENEE, as Executrix, etc., Appellant, v.
JAMES 'E. BROWN et al., Respondents.
,[1] Vendor "and Purchaser-Bona Fide Purchasers-Fraud.-A

bona fid~ purchaser is not chargeable with the fraud ~f his
predecessors and takes a title purgedo£ fl,ny anterior frll.ud
affecting it and free from any equities existing between the
original parties.

[1] See 25 Cal.Jur. 820.
,
,
McK. Dig; ~ef'erences: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 367j [2]
,Vendor andP1U'chaser, § 379; [31 Vendor andPurchiiser;'§ 384(3);
,[4J Judgnients, § 291; [5]j>leading,§139(3); [6] Judgments,§ 292;
.[7] Vendor arid Purchaser, §369(4)j [8, 9] Deeds, § 66(1)j [10]
Deeds, § 183 ; [i1] Attorneys, § 35; [12J Trial,§'299(2) ; [13J Ap'peru and 'Error, § 1564(2). '
"
'

[2] Id.-Bona Fide Purchasers-Possessionas·,Notic~.~Possession
of land imparts to an intending purchaser onlys)lchknowledge
as would. be gained by inquiry from one having possession.
[3] Id.-Bona Fide Purchasers-Evidence.---A· finding that 'purchasersfroin,an attorney of aft executrix were bonafide,purchasers without notice of her claim was sustained by theevi·
dence where, although she was in possession, ,she. told the pur~
chasers that she was collecting rent for the attorney, and where
it appeared from her acts and conversation that she fully
knew of the contemplated purchase and asserted no, interest
in the property.
'
[4] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Consideration Limited to' Beeord.-In a collateral attack upon a judgment or an order of a
probat.e court, the recitals In the record may not be contra:
dicted by'evidence of facts different from those appearing upon
its face.
[5] Pleading-Admissions-Failure to Deny.-Allegations in a
complaint as to the absence of a bid at a probate sale, an offer
of purchase, an intention to purchase or a purchase are not
controverted by a statement in the answer of a conclusion that
there was "an actual sale."
[6] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Consideration Limited to Record-Limitations.-The title of a bona fide purchaser may not
be successfully questioned, even though he admits by pleading,
or fails to object to the admission in evidence of, facts tending
to show the invalidity of the judgment or order upon, which it
is b/!-sed.
'
[7] Vendor and Purchaser-Bona Fide Purchasers-Claimant 'Under Void Deed.-The want of delivery of deed may be asserted against one claiming tItle as ,a bona fide purchaser an,d
relying on the grantee's possession of the instrUment.
[8] Deeds-Delivery-Intent.-Whether Ii. deed has, been delivered
is a question of intention. An intention of a grantor,.that his
deed shall be'legally operative is sufficient ,however maDifested.,
[9] . Id.-Delivery-IIitent-Recognition of Title•....;:Although,jtdeed ,
in the hands of the grantee may have been unacconip~ed",by' '
'a grantor's intention that it he legally e1Iective, his subsequent
recognition of title in the, grantee is in itself a delivery,that is,
an expression of intention 1:IY him thatthe,instrament, should
effect the transfer of title.
' ,
""
[10],Id ..iEvidence-Delivery.-A finding ,of a leg~ldelive~'~f
two deeds is supported, although it isnoi shown Who had possession of the original grantor's deed after' shesigIied' it and

a

[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 59.
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